The solution that might have been : resolving social conflict in deliberations about future electricity grid development. by Tobiasson,  W. & Jamasb,  T.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
13 May 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Tobiasson, W. and Jamasb, T. (2016) 'The solution that might have been : resolving social conﬂict in
deliberations about future electricity grid development.', Energy research and social science., 17 . pp. 94-101.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.04.018
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2016 This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
The Solution that Might Have Been: Resolving Social Conflict in 
Deliberations about Future Electricity Grid Development 
 
 
Wenche Tobiasson 
 
Tooraj Jamasb
*
 
 
Durham University Business School, Durham, UK 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Increasingly, local opposition to new electricity grid developments cause 
lengthy delays and places financial and practical strain on the projects. The 
structure of the electricity industry is in transition due to the emergence of 
smaller but more numerous generation facilities. Also, the wider society and 
local communities increasingly engage with energy and environmental issues. 
At the same time, the traditional decision making frameworks and processes 
are proving less effective in solving the present time conflicts between local 
communities and other stakeholders. This paper proposes an economic 
approach to resolve such conflicts. We discuss how compensation, benefit 
sharing, and property rights can have a role in reducing community opposition 
to grid developments. However, we argue that these methods need to be part 
of an overarching policy towards conflict resolution in grid development. We 
then propose that such impacts can be addressed within the framework of 
‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ sustainability. Finally, we suggest that the concepts of 
‘collective negotiation’ and ‘menu of options’ in regulatory economics can be 
adapted to operationalise the suggested sustainability-based approach to 
arrive at more efficient and socially desirable outcomes. The proposed 
framework can lead to the identification of socially acceptable outcomes that 
could otherwise have gone undetected. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A timely development of national infrastructures is a prerequisite for economic 
growth and is generally associated with significant economic and social returns 
(Easterly and Servén, 2003). Such undertakings include electricity transmission 
networks1, which following ambitious environmental targets need to connect a 
growing number of renewable energy facilities. While grid development projects 
normally have economic benefits, they often also involve adverse environmental 
impacts and give rise to community opposition.2, 3 Failing to reach agreement on 
deployment and siting of projects causes lengthy and costly delays to the 
planning process and even jeopardise the project altogether (Kunreuther et al., 
1996; RGI, 2012).  
Although community opposition to major national infrastructure projects is not 
new, the implications of local resistance for the future development of the sector 
are on the rise. The context of decision-making in the electricity sector has 
gradually shifted from one of being a primarily technical matter to an 
increasingly social, environmental, and thus political one. The current process, 
which can be described as a Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) approach, is 
perceived to be unfair and to lack transparency (Tobiasson et al., 2014). It is also 
unclear in terms of the roles of different stakeholders and how decisions are 
made, therefore eradicating potential local and public participation due to a lack 
of knowledge and information (Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2013). Consequently, 
the established decision making framework and processes seem increasingly 
ineffectively engage with more active local communities. 
                                                        
1 Grid developments can also include the lower voltage network, distribution. This paper focuses 
on transmission developments only. 
2 Apart from transmission grid development, other developments that cause local opposition 
include airports, prisons, power plants and linear structures such as pipelines, and railways. 
3 Distributed generation resources and storage facilities can sometimes presents themselves as 
alternatives or complementary to grid expansion. Therefore, adopting a wider perspective and 
early stage discussions of these with the public will facilitate the resolution of potential conflicts. 
At present, the alternatives presented by developers are in the form of under-grounding or re-
routing the proposed new lines. 
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There are three main reasons behind the increased involvement of the public 
and local communities in grid developments. First, the nature of the energy 
industry has been changing due to the emergence of smaller but more numerous 
generation facilities, thus increasing their visibility and potential local impact. 
Second, the public and community awareness and engagement in relation to the 
energy sector and environmental issues has increased. Third, whilst the nature 
of the sector and public engagement with the grid has changed, the institutional 
arrangements within which policy decisions are made have not changed. 
Traditionally, the grid company is responsible for balancing the generation of 
and demand for electricity and long-term planning for the future development 
needs of the grid. The grid owners produce technical development plans and 
presents these to the sector regulator and the policy makers. The affected 
communities are also informed and their views are also heard and noted. 
However, the communities are increasingly left with the impression that their 
views and interests are overlooked for national and system interests. Within this 
context, traditional solutions such as financial compensations and final stage 
minor concessions are insufficient. Thus, innovative approaches are required to 
adapt the decision-making framework to better suit the evolving and future 
needs and features of the sector. 
From an economic point of view, local opposition can be considered as the result 
of externalities caused by grid developments and imposed on neighbouring 
communities. Given the standard assumptions of economic rationality, perfect 
information and zero transaction costs, a solution that internalises the local 
externalities can, in theory, be derived. With regards to single location facilities, 
the potential for providing financial compensation to affected communities is 
explored in an extensive body of literature, initiated first by O’Hare (1977). 
However, the practical applications of a financial compensation are not trivial, 
including the difficulty in estimating the exact costs and benefits of projects and 
the public perception of compensation as a bribe (Frey et al., 1996). Other 
measures to foster acceptance and to increase the local retention of profits 
include the provision of community benefit schemes. These measures are 
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particularly common in wind power developments and have been successfully 
implemented in countries such as the UK, Denmark and Germany (CSE, 2009; 
Cass et al., 2010). 
Relative to renewable energy and other single location infrastructure facilities, 
grid developments have received comparatively limited attention from academic 
researchers (notable exceptions include Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013; Cotton and 
Devine-Wright, 2013; Soini et al., 2011). This is particularly the case with 
regards to compensation or community benefit schemes. Arguably, there are 
some shared characteristics between single location facilities and grid 
developments, such as large sunk costs, negative externalities, public goods, 
information asymmetries and similarities in resistance from local communities. 
However, the technical characteristics and economic regulation of transmission 
grids necessitate design of innovative approaches to organise local community 
impact and involvement in grid development. Therefore, there is a need for 
alternative modes of conceptualising community opposition and engagement 
with grid development projects (Batel et al., 2013). 
Drawing from established economic theories and concepts, this paper suggests a 
new approach based on the environmental sustainability perspective to facilitate 
a more efficient and socially acceptable planning and implementation of gird 
projects. The conceptual framework looks beyond the use of financial 
compensation to resolve grid and infrastructure development projects. Instead, 
we propose a sustainability-oriented framework that is strongly informed by 
economic theory but it also recognises the multidisciplinary of the issue. The 
proposed framework can also lead to the identification of socially acceptable 
outcomes that could remain undetected. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the economic properties of 
electricity networks and developments. Section 3 discusses the economics 
characteristics of community engagement in developments and reviews relevant 
literature. Section 4 outlines and applies an analytical framework to develop a 
conceptual model. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Economics of Electricity Networks and Grid Development 
2.1 Economic characteristics of electricity transmission networks 
Electricity networks are regarded as being natural monopolies. This implies that 
they are highly capital intensive and their cost structure is such that their fixed 
costs are very large in relation to the total costs. This feature results in declining 
average costs as their scale increases. As a result, the provision of a given 
quantity of output by a single network is more cost efficient than by several 
competing networks. Consequently, such networks are subject to public 
ownership or some form of economic regulation. This is true for both high 
voltage networks (transmission) and lower voltage networks (distribution). 
Although this paper considerers transmission developments only it is worth 
noting that the distribution networks across Europe are undergoing a 
considerable change. 
The introduction of smart technology, electric vehicles, and distributed 
generation are exerting pressure on the distribution grid to become more active 
in terms of managing and matching the supply and demand. The transmission 
grid is less affected by new technologies and is, compared to the distribution 
grid, already actively managing supply and demand since large generators are 
connected to the transmission grid. Moreover, transmission networks are 
considered as transportation networks – transmitting large volumes of high 
voltage electricity over long distances with no or few outlets along the way. This 
gives rise to particular issues as many communities do not benefit from the 
developments despite living next to it. 
Network utilities generally operate under licence agreements that oblige them to 
connect the generators and end-users in a timely and effective manner. The 
utilities are also expected to operate the network in a cost efficient manner. In 
return, the utility can charge the users for the use of network services and earn a 
regulated return or revenue (Joskow, 2007). The network charges are, in the first 
instance, accrued to generators and retail suppliers but are ultimately passed to 
end users through their bills. Many networks in Europe operate under incentive 
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regulation models that reward firms for cost efficiency and penalises high costs 
(Joskow, 2013). 
The costs incurred by network utilities can be classified into allowable 
controllable and non-controllable costs. Non-controllable costs are regarded as 
being beyond the control of the management and are generally treated as pass-
through and thus do not affect the profits of the utility. On the other hand, 
controllable costs are subject to reward and penalty incentives. A cost type or 
item that is disallowed by the regulator will directly and negatively affect the 
revenue and profit of the utility. Allowed operating costs can be recovered and 
allowed investments will earn a specified return (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). 
A key objective of the sector regulator is to maximise the socio-economic welfare 
of the consumers. The regulator in effect acts as the guardian of public interest 
who cannot individually protect their interest. Costs that are over and above the 
efficient level will reduce the net system benefits. Although major grid projects 
may have net system benefits, uneven distribution of the costs and benefits as 
well as a disparity between private (developer) and social (local) costs, can cause 
distributional implications between local and national interests. It appears that 
while regulators are tasked with protecting public interest they are less able to 
balance the distributional inequity that arise between the local public and wider 
public. Compensations to local communities are also a financial transfer to ease 
the distributional implications between the communities and the consumers of 
the grid services as a whole. Prior to addressing the specific methods and 
mechanisms for compensation or community benefits, it is important to 
conceptualise the nature of community level environmental impact and 
entitlement to compensation in economic terms. 
 
2.2 Economic characteristics of transmission projects  
Transmission lines cross long stretches of land and each new project has a 
number of stakeholders, including the government, local authority, local 
businesses, landowners, local communities, and interest organisations. Each 
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stakeholder perceives the grid projects differently and has their own view and 
experience of the decision process. These heterogeneous views and objectives of 
stakeholders often cause conflict of interest and opposition. Moreover, 
information asymmetries among the actors can intensify the frictions between 
stakeholders further as it can induce rent-seeking behaviour and reduce trust 
between them. Consequently, the economics of grid development can be 
characterised as having high transaction costs. Achieving agreements that 
internalise the externalities caused by transmission projects can be costly to 
negotiate, especially when the number of stakeholders and the range of interests 
involved are large (Tobiasson et al., 2014). 
A grid project can be thought of as having two types of costs – i.e. private costs in 
the form of construction and maintenance costs as well as external (social) costs 
accrued to third parties. The latter type of costs can include direct economic 
costs such as loss of revenue to owners of agricultural land and negative 
environmental externalities. The direct economic costs are observable and 
measurable through market prices or compensation methods. For instance, there 
are established norms and formulas for compensating owners of farmlands for 
loss of use value of land in terms of lost output and revenue. 
The main difficulty arises, however, when taking the external costs in the form of 
intrinsic value of environmental amenities accrued to third parties, i.e. affected 
communities, into account. Grid development projects can be viewed as having 
an effect on public goods characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry in 
consumption. The affected communities enjoy limited or no direct benefits from 
the project, similar to a railway passing the community without stopping at the 
local station. The effects of these externalities such as negative visual, health, and 
environmental effects as well as financial loss through reduced property values, 
translate into reduced utility and economic welfare (Cohen et al., 2014).4 
                                                        
4 In the absence of explicit valuation, public goods can implicitly be assigned a monetary value of 
zero. Some scholars point to the ethical issues in placing monetary value on the environment 
(e.g., Sagoff, 2004). Others view monetisation as an option, while accepting that such valuation 
can be flawed, a value over zero is better than no value (see, e.g., Pearce 1994; Helm 2000). When 
the value of a resource is unknown or zero, it may be over-exploited. This often holds for 
resources that lack clearly defined property rights thus giving rise to conflicts of interest. 
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3. Community Engagement and Conflict in Grid Development 
3.1 The causes of conflicts 
A growing body of literature considers the motives behind and discusses 
possible measures to reduce community opposition to locally unwanted 
facilities. The pejorative label of NIMBY (not in my backyard) opposition is 
considered as outdated (Burningham et al., 2006) and recent work has revealed 
a complex heterogeneous composition of opposition5 (Batel and Devine-Wright, 
2014; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2013; Johnson and Scicchitano, 2012; Wolsink, 
2000). Research to date is predominantly focused on single location facilities, 
such as renewable energy generation technologies (Jobert et al., 2007; Wolsink, 
2000; Devine-Wright, 2011), as well as waste and hazardous facilities (Johnson 
and Scicchitano, 2012; Kunreuther et al., 1996). 
Opposition to transmission projects, characterised as linear infrastructure, are 
similar to those of single location infrastructure. The main triggers of public 
resistance include strong place attachments to the local area; the type, level and 
quality of communication; lack of trust for the developer and governmental 
agencies; harmful effects on health and the environment; and unconvincing 
arguments for the need case of the new line and for any beneficial impacts 
arising from it 6 (Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2013; 
Devine-Wright, 2013). 
Unlike local communities, landowners tend to be consulted at the initial stages of 
planning when the optimal route is being identified, mainly because they possess 
a legal right to their land and others cannot normally use the land without their 
consent. In theory, financial compensation offered at the market rate of the land 
should be accepted. However, in practice, this is not always the case, as seen in 
the development of a Irish gas pipeline where five landowners were imprisoned 
                                                        
5 Rather than the homogeneous assumptions defining NIMBY opposition. 
6 Criticism of the need case often refer to alternative technological solutions, e.g. distributed 
generation and enforcing existing lines. 
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following their refusal to allow the developer access to their land (Gilmartin, 
2009).7 
Public and local opposition to new transmission lines is a common cause of 
costly delays and can emerge as a barrier to the realisation of future low-carbon 
systems. Recent cases of conflicts include the Scottish Beauly-Denny line, which 
was the subject of the longest ever public inquiry in Scotland (Tobiasson et al., 
2014); the France-Spain interconnection project, first proposed in 1980 and met 
by considerable opposition bringing round a second proposal in 2003 (Ciupuliga 
and Cuppen, 2013); and the Norwegian Hardanger transmission line, which was 
one of the 2010’s most reported news stories in Norway (Ruud et al., 2011). 
Devine-Wright et al. (2010) find that public beliefs of energy networks are rather 
detached from reality. Generally, electricity networks are seen to be represented 
by technological structures, such as cables and pylons, rather than organisations 
and systematic networks. Moreover, in the planning of new lines, the study found 
great disbelief in the process, especially regarding stakeholder engagement and 
who can actually influence project developments. The invisibility of network 
firms and disbelief in the planning process is thought to increase public 
opposition and delays to new infrastructure developments. 
Public opposition is argued to have played a large role in the delayed France-
Spain interconnection project (Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013). The project lacked 
transparency and the publics requests of undergrounding the line were ignored 
without explanation. As a result, citizens felt overlooked and cooperation 
between stakeholders ceased. Similarly, the Scottish Beauly-Denny project was 
criticised by local communities for disregarding their points of view and lack of 
communication. Trust and perceived procedural justice is arguably important for 
public acceptance (Bronfman et al., 2012; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007). 
Moreover, in a study on electricity generation sources Bronfman et al. (2012) 
find that perceived benefit of a new installation had the greatest effect on 
                                                        
7 However, compensation to landowners are not considered here as each sector has established 
norms and methods of addressing direct losses. In this paper we focus on the environmental 
impacts of grid development projects on local communities, which are often ignored. 
10 
 
acceptability. This is one of the reasons to why opposition to transmission 
projects is particularly difficult to address and why the experience from single 
location facilities is of limited usefulness. Part of the difficulty in addressing the 
stakeholder conflicts in grid developments lie in the challenge to define, measure 
and compensate communities for their environmental impacts. The benefits of 
most infrastructure facilities are spread across the economy, whilst much of 
their adverse impacts tend to be local. This is also the case with energy 
generation plants. 
However, for energy generation plants the capacities and outputs, and therefore 
the benefits, are more easily measureable in both physical and monetary terms. 
Meanwhile, the large geographic span of linear infrastructures often affects 
multiple communities rather than a single host community. Also, due to the 
complex design and technical nature of the grid, the system benefits associated 
with an incremental network expansion or enhancement project can be difficult 
to estimate. As such, local communities perceive the benefits of a transmission 
line as limited, thus intensifying conflicts. 
 
3.2 The need for a new approach to grid conflicts 
Although there are some shared characteristics with other energy facilities, the 
technical and economic features of transmission grid projects are different in 
several respects and thus require specific solutions. For instance, measuring the 
relevant output of an incremental new line for compensation and benefit sharing 
is considerably more complicated. Also, electricity transmission networks are 
natural monopolies and require economic regulation. 
New grid projects are ultimately financed by electricity consumers through 
transmission fees collected on electricity bills. Thus increasing the project costs 
through either undergrounding lines or paying compensation is borne by all 
electricity users across the country. In terms of land-use, transmission lines are 
linear infrastructures, covering great stretches of land, thus affecting many 
stakeholders, types of land, land uses, and sensitive areas. Additionally, the 
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physical features of networks complicate matters further as a change in one part 
of the network will also have an effect on the rest of the system. Consequently, 
specific benefits of grid upgrades are difficult to identify, quantify, and allocate. 
Rather than confined benefits of a single line, any upgrade benefits the reliability 
and security of the network as a whole. 
Figure 1 illustrates the main insights from recent research and the economic 
characteristics of grid developments. The figure shows the key dimensions and 
features of community engagement when implementing a new grid project. On 
the one hand, issues related to private goods with few stakeholders are 
considered. Decisions are made based on individual preferences, choice and 
rationale. On the other hand, the issues related to public goods on a social level 
and rationale is represented. 
 
Figure 1. Dimensions of community engagement 
Source: Adapted from Vatn (2005, 419) 
 
The figure identifies two approaches to community engagement with grid 
projects. Goods, which have private ownership and entitlement, can be 
considered on an individual level as they involve few stakeholders. Issues on an 
individual level may therefore be managed through an instrumental approach. 
The term instrumental refers to a set framework that can be applied in a similar 
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way in different situations without much modification. This is the current 
approach for compensation to landowners for structures placed on their land, 
for example, through offering a fixed amount per pylon or a wind turbine, 
dependent on its size or alternatively on its energy produced or transmitted. 
Conversely, goods which are public in nature and entitlement, and thus must be 
considered on a social level, i.e. involve many stakeholders, require a collective 
negotiation approach. When the number of stakeholders is high, and a decision 
will affect large groups, the importance of communication increases, especially 
as two-way negotiations. As illustrated by the figure, communication on a 
collective level is the approach that could be adopted in engagement with 
communities. This is however seldom the case, giving rise to conflicts (RGI, 
2012). 
In order to increase public trust, reduce stakeholder conflicts, and encourage 
acceptance of new grid developments, recent research suggests better 
information provision and more emphasis on communication and community 
involvement at an earlier stage and in a more deliberative planning process (RGI, 
2012; Newig and Kvarda, 2012; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012; CSE, 2009). 
Additionally, Ciupuliga and Cuppen (2013) highlight the role of dialogue in the 
planning process, which is argued to not only improve the potential to reach 
agreement but also benefit the project through the access to local knowledge and 
insights. 
The lessons emerging from the above mentioned cases and similar projects 
suggest that they share some key features. Such conflicts are often treated on an 
ad hoc basis whilst trust and perceived procedural justice of the process is 
generally low. The conflicts are often treated as planning and financial 
compensation matters while sustainability and citizenship aspects are often the 
root cause of the conflicts. For example, financial arrangements such as 
compensations and benefit sharing schemes have been suggested as practical 
measures to redistribute the costs and benefits of large projects in order to make 
the outcome of decision-making more socially acceptable and economically 
efficient. 
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An important issue with a purely monetary approach is that it fails to take into 
account the broader range of reasons behind community opposition. Therefore, a 
broader theory-informed approach and conceptualisation of community 
engagement with grid projects is needed to devise structure and more effective 
solutions to resolve them (Been, 1993). 
 
4. Towards a Sustainable Grid Development Approach 
4.1 Financial compensation and benefit provision 
A common measure to assist the siting of locally unwanted facilities, which has 
long been the focus of particularly economic researchers, is that of monetary 
compensation to prospective host communities. This notion was first introduced 
by O’Hare (1977), declaring it to be necessary for an efficient siting process. 
More recently, Lesbirel (1998) find compensation to positively facilitate the 
siting of energy plants in Japan while McAdam et al. (2010) argues that failing to 
compensate the host country of a pipeline is linked to mobilised opposition. 
Community compensation through financial arrangements can in principal be in 
the form of (i) one-off lump sum payments, (ii) a stream of payments; or (iii) 
some form of part-ownership. Alternatively, the developers can offer direct 
investments in the community such as infrastructural upgrades (e.g. new and 
better roads, increased connectivity such as fibre optic broadband) or other 
benefits such as tax reductions or reduced energy prices. 
Lump sum payments involve one-off payments to a community fund when the 
project starts operating. Assuming good management and careful investment the 
fund could generate continued income. Alternatively, a developer may offer 
annual payments. In wind power developments in the UK this is normally per 
megawatt (e.g., £5,000 per MW), linked to the generation capacity, energy output 
of the project, or a fraction of the revenues generated (CSE, 2009). As mentioned, 
given the nature of transmission development projects, the output and added 
benefits of a new line are difficult to determine rendering such measures difficult 
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to implement. Instead a less direct option could be to link the size of 
compensation to total investments, number of pylons, or perhaps per km of grid 
length. 
A share in the project can either be provided as a form of compensation from the 
developer or acquired as an investment (CSE, 2009). In a study conducted in 
Scotland, Warren and McFadyen (2010) find that local ownership may have a 
positive effect on public attitudes towards wind farms. Allan et al. (2011) 
suggests that local community ownership and thus local retention of profits 
increase the economic impact of wind farms. However, direct application of the 
instruments used in wind power developments for transmission lines is difficult. 
For a regulated industry, where profits are generally earned through return on 
assets rather than through market operation, the nature of the risks is different. 
Additionally, the deposition of the electricity grid and dependency with other 
parts of the network make it difficult to integrate community ownership of one 
or part of a transmission line. 
However, offering financial compensation is not a one size fits all solution. Frey 
et al. (1996) argues that offering compensation to prospective host communities 
will have a negative effect on acceptance and Kunreuther and Easterling (1990) 
and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (1995), find no link between financial compensation 
and efficient siting and local approval of nuclear-waste repositories. Instead, the 
perception of compensation as a bribe and the crowding out of the feeling of 
civic duty can increase the opposition to the project. This was shown to be the 
case in a Swiss study where the rate of community acceptance of a nuclear-waste 
repository was found to decline, from 50.8 to 24.6 percent, when compensation 
was offered compared to when no compensation was offered (Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
As a result, rather than using direct financial compensation, Frey et al. (1996) 
suggests that in-kind compensation, intended to benefit the community as a 
whole, weakens the bribe effect and thus supports the siting process of locally 
unwanted projects. An example of local benefit sharing is the provision of 
‘Community Benefit Schemes’. Such sharing schemes, which may contain “good-
15 
 
will” gestures, such as upgrading a road, a new playground, payments to a 
community fund or community ownership, have proven effective in increasing 
local support for wind power developments. This is particularly the case in 
countries such as Denmark and Spain, where local ownership, and thus greater 
local retention of profits, are more common (CSE, 2009; Warren and McFadyen, 
2010; Allan et al., 2011). However, UK communities remain unconvinced of the 
intentions behind the benefit provision with many still considering it as a 
method to silent opposition with bribes (Cass et al., 2010). Even well intentioned 
developers seldom receive the trust of local communities, which may be partially 
due to the timing of the offered compensation (Aitken, 2010). 
In the reminder of this section we discuss the building blocks of our proposed 
approach to compensation for environmental impact of grid development and 
contrast these with those of conventional measures to mitigate local opposition 
and conflict. These are outlined in Figure 2. Following from Figure 1, the 
suggested approach takes a public good view of environmental impact of 
sustainable grid development that can be subject to social and public policy 
decision making process. This places the proposed approach at the top right 
corner of Figure 1. 
 
Figure 2: Environmental impact of grid development and compensation 
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4.2 A property rights view of grid development 
While the communities affected by grid development may oppose the projects, 
the nature of the community claim on the local environment needs some 
consideration. The affected communities (apart from landowners) do not 
normally have a private ownership right to the landscape in question. 
Nevertheless, they have the right to the use of their immediate natural 
environment along with the general public. 
However, if a community have enjoyed the benefits of a public good, such as a 
landscape or scenery, over time, a right to use may come to be perceived as 
actual ownership entitlement or right to these8. Such formation of entitlement or 
rights is common and also occurs in the case of subsidies, licences, or quotas that 
are awarded and renewed over long periods of time. A community can assume or 
behave as having a property right or private entitlement to local aspects of 
public goods adversely affected by grid projects. Thus the perception of 
entitlement to a quasi-private property or user rights becomes a central, though 
subtle, aspect of the opposition to the project. 
Using a property rights view, we consider a simple case of community 
compensation or benefit receipt to reach a resolution. In order to construct a 
new transmission line, there are two technical options: An overhead line at cost 
(A) or, a more costly partially undergrounded cable at cost (B). The cost 
difference between the two options is thus (B-A) and undergrounding is 
assumed to achieve project acceptance.9 If the general public holds the property 
rights to the affected landscape, the local communities can be thought as having 
a willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid the project. This WTP will be equal to (B-A) 
and to the willingness to accept (WTA) of the general public (or network utility) 
as they are indifferent between the two options given that the project costs to 
them remain the same. 
                                                        
8 Note that this view of entitlement and benefit is purely from an economic perspective, opinions 
of other fields of research, such as environmental phycology, would no doubt differ. 
9 Although this may not be a realistic assumption in real world situations we use this simplified 
view to illustrate our example. 
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Alternatively, the property rights to the landscape can be allocated to the 
affected local communities10. In this case, the community can accept the project 
through a WTA mechanism. In this case, the society or the developer will have a 
maximum WTP that is equal to the cost difference between the underground and 
overhead options (B-A), which is also equal to the maximum WTA the 
communities can achieve. If the communities demand more than (B-A) they will 
receive nothing as the developer will choose to underground the line. 
Following Coase (1960), the outcomes of the above two cases are equal in terms 
of economic efficiency as the WTA and WTP will be equal to (B-A). However, 
depending on the initial allocation of property rights, the distributional effects 
and the actual or perceived equity implications are significant and crucial from a 
political economy point of view. For example, the former case may be perceived 
as being unfair that the communities should be expected to pay off the wider 
society in order to avoid the negative impact of the project or have the line 
placed underground. 
Theoretically, WTA and WTP are assumed to be equal. However, experimental 
evidence suggests that WTA is usually greater than WTP. Following the example 
above, we have two potential outcomes. Independent of whether the property 
right lies with the community of the developer, if WTP is higher or equal to the 
cost of undergrounding, the project will go ahead and placed underground. If 
however, the cost of undergrounding the line is greater than the WTP, the 
project will not be realised. Again, the implications in terms of social and 
distributional point of view are significantly different and will affect the manner 
in which the project will be perceived. 
 
4.3 A sustainability approach to grid development 
The economic approaches to community engagement in grid development based 
on individual or collective compensation, benefit sharing, and property rights 
                                                        
10 Note that transmission lines may affect other than local residents although not captured by 
this approach. 
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allocation can help reduce community opposition to grid development projects. 
However, these approaches have, on their own, methodological and practical 
shortcomings. The main limitation is related to that of identification as well as 
the lack of clear property rights and assignment of such rights in the absence of 
clear entitlement to these. In addition, although such approaches could help 
reduce the level of conflict, they may not necessarily be desirable from an 
environmental sustainability point of view as they are generally short-term 
approaches without a sustainability and intertemporal rationale. Therefore, the 
above economic instruments can be more effective when used within a high level 
environmental strategy that links the individual and community interests to an 
overarching social policy and public decision rule and process (see Cain and 
Nelson, 2013). Given the above reasoning, we propose an economics informed 
environmental sustainability approach as the basis for a coherent and 
comprehensive decision framework. 
This alternative economic approach can be explored based around the concept of 
environmental sustainability and the related notion of intergenerational equity. 
Within this perspective, the adverse environmental effects of grid projects can be 
viewed in terms of transformation of natural assets from one form to another. As 
first suggested by Hardwick (1977) and Solow (1986), the total value of a non-
renewable environmental resource can be preserved over time by investing or 
transforming the benefits or rents from the use of a natural resource into other 
assets. This transformation can be in the form of strong or weak sustainability. 
In a strong sustainability viewpoint, the total value of a resource or natural asset 
is to be maintained for current and future generations if an equivalent value of 
environmental asset can be created from the rents. This can, for example, be part 
of an ecological strategy which attempts to preserve ecosystem services. On the 
other hand, within a weak sustainability view, some form of financial or social 
capital (in this case perhaps community capital) of the same value can be created 
from the benefits of the project. Other possibilities such as transforming the 
natural asset into physical or human capital can also exist in the spectrum of 
sustainability options (Ayres et al., 1998; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). Weak 
sustainability draws on the notion that environmental problems are caused by 
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inefficient use of natural resources. By monetising externalities (caused by 
inefficiencies) the costs can be internalised and a solution devised. The economic 
rent from a project would be redistributed and social costs would equal to 
private costs. Practical examples of weak sustainability policy in include the 
sovereign funds in resource rich countries, such as Norway who uses the 
Norwegian Petroleum Fund to invest part of their proceeds from oil extraction in 
the North Sea in financial assets. 
The environmental impact of a grid development can be viewed in terms of weak 
and strong sustainability. If a grid development project is deemed to produce a 
net socio-economic surplus this implies the project can compensate for the 
environmental damage of the project. This compensation can be in the form of 
creating an equivalent benefit or value elsewhere. Within this framework, the 
wider society as a whole must decide on the acceptable form of the 
transformation and conversion of the value of the natural assets affected by grid 
development while preserving their total value – i.e. whether the natural asset 
affected should be transformed into another natural asset or into physical, 
financial, social, or human capital. This decision should be part of a high level and 
long-term sustainability strategy that informs the decision-making framework, 
rules, and processes. 
4.3.1 From compensation and benefit sharing to community investment  
Compensation of a public nature can be perceived to be fairer and more honest 
compared to individual monetary compensation and is thus more likely to be 
successful (Terwel et al., 2014: Frey et al., 1996). However, grid projects have 
lasting inter-temporal environmental impacts. A weakness of ad hoc and narrow 
approaches based on compensation and benefit sharing is that they may result in 
one-off short-term solutions and settlements that do not ensure dynamic and 
inter-generational equity. Therefore, preserving the value of an environmental 
asset will often require investment in other assets that produce sustainable long-
term benefits. 
It is, in principal, possible for the society to adhere to a strong or weak 
sustainability criterion and create ‘community capital’ through ‘community 
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investments’ in another form of capital. For example, the Beauly-Denny 
transmission line project had an element of both strong and weak sustainability; 
the developers were required to improve the environment along certain sections 
beyond the effect of the new line and in two cases they were also required to 
provide financial compensation to affected communities11. 
Assigning compensation to individual members of a community is impractical as 
the transaction costs would increase significantly with allocating individual 
compensation rights. Also, the task of identifying who is entitled to compensation 
is difficult as there are often no defined criteria. Proximity to the new line may 
seem an obvious measure - for example, Sims and Dent (2005) find that 
proximity to a transmission line lowers property prices and Gibbons (2014) 
suggests similar results with regards to wind power developments. However, 
where the dividing lines for compensation should be drawn is difficult. A more 
suitable approach is therefore to aggregate compensations and the method 
agreed on through collective negotiations on a society-wide level. 
4.3.2 Community investment through collective negotiation 
As a complement to traditional regulatory approaches, some regulators in North 
America have adopted negotiated settlements between utilities and their 
costumers to determine cost, price and operating projections. Negotiated 
settlements have proved to limit the regulatory workload, decreasing delays and 
increase efficiency (Doucet and Littlechild, 2006). Similarly, community 
investments can benefit from applying the method of negotiated settlement, or 
here, collective negotiation. 
Offering investments in community infrastructure or services is common in wind 
power developments, often labelled as ‘community benefits’. Upgrading roads or 
recreational spaces gives a developer the opportunity to work directly with the 
community. Transmission developments involve several communities (rather 
than one host community as in the case of energy generation facilities) and each 
                                                        
11 This additional cost was approved by Ofgem the energy regulator as it was a condition of the 
consent from the Scottish ministers. 
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community has specific needs that can be identified through participation in the 
planning process and addressed when developing the compensatory approach. 
Furthermore, by encouraging the stakeholders to reveal private information 
about their preferences, negotiations between the developer and the community 
about the level and type of compensation can increase social welfare. Here, the 
concepts of weak and strong sustainability can act as a starting point and guide 
the negotiations on how the environmental costs of a development are to be 
allocated and how the rents from it may be redistributed. 
Oberholzer-Gee et al. (1995) find that granting authority to affected communities 
and two-way negotiations, thus customer and public participation in the 
planning process, increases local approval of the facilities. Such negotiation will 
open for innovative solutions that would not have been envisaged by policy 
makers and developers as local knowledge and needs is utilised, thus increasing 
the efficiency and welfare effect of the outcome (Doucet and Littlechild, 2006; 
Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013). This is further emphasized by Kunreuther and 
Easterling (1996), arguing the case for a voluntary siting process and negotiated 
compensation, rather than using predetermined compensation measures 
without community influence. 
Moreover, compensating the communities rather than the individual members 
reduces the transaction costs low as the number of participants in negotiations is 
lower. Nevertheless, even when the number of participants is low, negotiations 
risk the possibility of a breakdown if the parties fail to reach an agreement. In 
order to reduce the probability of unsuccessful negotiations, an independent 
authority such as the sector regulator could step in as mediator, which will 
intervene in case that no agreement is reached. It is, however, in the interest of 
both parties to reach an agreement as, in case of failure to agree, the regulator 
can impose a socio-economically less favourable outcome (Doucet and 
Littlechild, 2006). Appointing an ultimate decision maker and arbitrator also 
limits the appeal of hold up as it is less likely that one party to negotiations can 
delay the process through rent seeking behaviour. 
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4.3.3 Menu of options method for collective negotiations  
At the presence of uncertainty and information asymmetry it is difficult to form 
and maintain robust principal-agent relationships. The transaction costs are 
higher in negotiations, leading to inefficient outcomes. In regulatory economics, 
the use of a menu of options or contracts is expected to reduce the effect of 
uncertainty and information asymmetry (Laffont and Tirole, 1986; Laffont, 
1993). Keeping consumer welfare constant, the regulator can offer the firm a 
choice of different regulatory contracts, which essentially consist of different 
combinations of cost sharing provisions (a fixed component and a component 
dependent on the responsiveness of the firm’s revenues to costs). The firm will 
choose the optimising contract depending on its cost opportunities (Joskow, 
2007). Pareto improvements are possible since consumer welfare is kept 
constant and firms can increase their welfare due to the flexibility to choose an 
optimising contract based on private firm information which was previously 
unknown by the regulator (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1992). 
A menu of contracts can thus be used in order to elicit information and increase 
efficiency. Drawing on the theory of economic regulation, a similar approach may 
be developed to optimize the provision of sustainability-based compensations 
for transmission grid projects. In this, the developer offers the affected 
community a set of compensatory measures. The cost of different alternatives 
can be held constant at a reference cost, for example in the above case at the 
difference between the cost of an overhead line and an underground cable. Given 
the knowledge in terms of different compensatory options, a menu of options 
may, for example, consist of choices between community fund payments, 
infrastructure developments, community ownership, and environmental 
investments. 
By providing a menu of options, the communities can choose among a set of 
sustainable solutions that maximizes their welfare depending on their attributes 
and value to the community. This self-selecting process is preferable since 
choosing one contract or option is the equivalent of revealing internal 
information, which would otherwise remain unknown. Thus the process is more 
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efficient than if the developer or the government were to design and implement 
a policy without consulting the community through collective negotiation within 
a sustainability framework. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The electricity networks need to upgrade and expand in order to meet the future 
demands of the sector, including connecting smaller yet numerous conventional 
and renewable generation facilities. However, many new transmission lines are 
facing opposition from the affected local communities on the grounds of their 
environmental impacts. The conflicts cause delays and prolong planning thus 
adding to the project costs and foregone system benefits. The conventional 
decision approaches seem unable to resolve many of the conflicts. There is 
therefore a need for a new approach to address the community opposition to 
grid development projects. 
In this paper we discussed direct compensation and benefit sharing methods, as 
well as property rights approaches and how these measures can play a role in 
reducing community opposition to grid development. However, these methods 
currently lack an overarching theoretical and methodological framework to 
structure and guide the process, which is important for gaining the trust and 
acceptance of communities and society as a whole. Additionally, methods based 
on purely compensatory measures are not devised to allow for public and local 
participation in the planning process and therefore fail to address the underlying 
causes of opposition. 
We suggest a socio-economic approach to grid development that is based on the 
concepts of weak and strong sustainability and that the environmental affected 
by grid developments, rather than the community per se, can be compensated 
within a sustainability approach. It is however ultimately for the larger society to 
decide, through public and social policy decision framework, on the nature of the 
compensation along the spectrum of weak to strong sustainability options - e.g. 
in the form of lasting investments in environmental, physical, financial, social, or 
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human capital. This compensation can, to an agreed upon extent, accrue to the 
affected communities; although it is up to the society decide on how and on the 
level. While financial compensations appeal to the consumer dimension of 
communities and members as economic agents, compensation in the form of 
environmental assets appeals to the citizenship dimension of these. 
The suggested mechanism can be in the form of collective negotiations between 
the communities and developer with the consent of the regulator and policy 
makers. Collective negotiations ensure that stakeholders are better able to 
participate in the decision-making framework. The efficiency and acceptance of 
the outcome of collective negotiations can then be further improved through the 
use of a menu of options; an established concept in regulatory economics. This 
paper provides a conceptual framework that unlocks an area of potential 
empirical research. Future studies should examine the practical application and 
the process of operationalizing the sustainability approach. 
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